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Abstract: The existing literature on the performance of monetary policy regimes is 
separate and isolated, with unidentified monetary policy framework for floating rate 
regime in the exchange rate regime literature and non-inflation targeting regime in the 
inflation targeting literature. This paper proposes a comprehensive de facto 
classification of monetary policy regimes based on the behavior of economic 
variables. The result reveals a non-negligible number of “hidden inflation targeters”, 
which use inflation targeting monetary policy in the absence of formally announced 
inflation targets. Based on the classification result, we also document monetary 
history and stylized facts that are highly consistent to our conventional 
understandings. 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: E42, E52, E58 
Keywords: Monetary Policy Regimes; Inflation Targeting; Exchange-rate Targeting 
  
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Terence Tai-Leung Chong, Department of Economics, The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong. Email: chong2064@cuhk.edu.hk.  
2 
 
 “Floating is not a well-defined monetary policy. If the central bank doesn’t fix 
the exchange rate, it has to do something else—but what? The academic profession 
should move away from considering ‘Exchange Rate Regimes’ and instead classify 
countries by ‘Monetary Policy Frameworks’.” 
 
Rose (2011) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy is arguably one of the most important tools for government to 
influence the economy. Economists and policy-makers have long sought the ideal 
framework for monetary policy. Three nominal variables- namely exchange rate, 
monetary aggregate and inflation, have been suggested to be the most appealing 
anchors and are widely studied1. Contrary to the long-established record on exchange 
rate arrangements, however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) compiles a 
comprehensive classification on monetary policy regimes for its members in recent 
years only2. 
 
Several studies in the inflation targeting literature, including Ball and Sheriden 
(2005), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Carare and Stone (2006), Cottarelli and 
Giannini (1997), Fatas et al. (2007), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), have 
extended the identification of inflation targeters to a longer period and a larger group 
of countries. Most of these works, including the classification of the IMF have used 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Friedman (1968), Bernanke et al. (1999) and Mishkin (1999). The well-known 
Taylor rule and variants are also regarded as a monetary policy rule for inflation targeting as suggested 
in Mishkin (1999) and Svensson (1999). 
2 A “De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks” has been 
included in IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions after 2001. 
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the announcement of inflation targets as their main identification strategy 3 . The 
classified regimes in these studies are therefore de jure in nature. The announcement 
of inflation targets is considered as an important element of the inflation targeting 
policy, especially when inflation targeting is viewed as a framework in a broad sense4. 
However, the large literature on exchange rate regimes has shown that policies of 
many countries in practice may not be consistent with their publicly disclosed 
regimes. For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2005) have identified a number of countries as having “fear of floating” and “hidden 
pegs”. The works of Stone and Bhundia (2004) and Carare and Stone (2006) also find 
that some countries, named as implicit price stability anchors, manage their monetary 
policy to maintain low and stable inflation without any announced targets on inflation. 
Another group of countries, by contrast, have low credibility to prove the announced 
inflation targets as their foremost policy objective. Similarly, Mishkin (p.5, 2001) also 
argues that several monetary aggregate targeting countries failed to control inflation 
because “monetary targeting was not pursued seriously” by these countries. 
 
The literature on exchange rate regimes is probably more extensive and has a 
longer history. The possible deviation of a country’s intervention in foreign exchange 
markets in practice from its declared, or de jure exchange rate regime is considered in 
several de facto classifications including Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005). Similar to the inflation targeting literature, however, an 
alternative monetary policy framework is not well identified in the exchange rate 
regime literature. The unidentified monetary policy framework for floating exchange 
rate regimes and non-inflation targeting countries in the two areas of study causes the 
                                                 
3 Stone and Bhundia (2004) and the related work of Carare and Stone (2006) are two exceptions and 
are discussed later. 
4 See, for example, Bernanke et al. (2001) and Mishkin (2001). 
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separation and incompleteness of the analyses in the existing literature. This weakness 
begins to receive increasing attention in the recent literature, including Rose (2011) 
and the comments from Mark Gertler in Ball and Sheridan (2005)5. 
 
This paper proposes a comprehensive de facto classification of monetary 
policy regimes. Country-year observations are put into two clearly defined monetary 
policy regimes, namely exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting6 according to 
the observed volatility of three classification variables: interest rate, exchange rate and 
inflation. As suggested in a simple New Keynesian model, monetary policy regime 
with a specific target is associated with changes in interest rates aimed at reducing the 
volatility of the target variable. These criteria are used to group country-year 
observations in alternative de facto monetary policy regimes based on their similarity 
in the behavior of classification variables with K-means cluster analysis. 
 
The classification identifies 1,489 and 2,952 country-year observations in the 
inflation targeting regime and exchange rate targeting regime respectively. Based on 
the classification result, this paper documents the monetary history and stylized facts 
of the two monetary policy regimes. The result reveals that inflation targeting policy 
has a much longer history before central banks began to announce official inflation 
targets in the 1990s. The number of these “hidden inflation targeters”, inflation 
targeting countries without announcing targets, is found to be non-negligible. Stylized 
facts of the two regimes revisited in this study are largely consistent with the findings 
in the literature. This suggests that convention understanding of the two regimes 
                                                 
5 Mark Gertler has made the following comment in Ball and Sheridan (2005). “In principle, one can 
only assess the effects of inflation targeting by having a clear alternative monetary policy regime as a 
benchmark. That is, to draw conclusions about inflation targeting, one must ask what it is being 
compared to.”  
6 The rationale for the regimes to be included in this classification is in section 2. 
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documented separately in the exchange rate and inflation targeting literature may 
remain valid in a direct comparison of exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting 
regimes. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodology used in the classification with details of the monetary policy regimes to 
be identified, classification variables and clusters suggested by a simple New 
Keynesian model and the classification procedure. Discussions on the classification 
result are given in section 3 with comparisons between existing classifications in the 
literature and an interpretation of modern monetary history based on the result. 
Section 4 documents the stylized facts of the two classified monetary policy regimes. 
The choice of alternative regimes is also explored with a Probit model using the panel 
data. A brief conclusion is offered in section 5. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This study covers the post-Bretton Woods period from 1974 to 2009 and the 
228 countries reported to the IMF during this period. This results in 7,980 country-
year observations at the most. Upon excluding 3,902 observations with unavailable 
data for at least one of the classification variables7 and 161 outliers in the data, the 
remaining 3,917 observations are classified using the cluster analysis. 
 
Cluster analysis is one of the popular methods used to identify groups of 
homogeneous observations in the data. Homogeneity between data is quantified with 
                                                 
7 In some cases, data of a country may not be available since the country does not exist in the entire 
sample period. Out of the 228 countries reported in the list of IMF, 186 countries have been classified 
at least for one period. 
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various similarity or distance measures, such as Euclidean distance in the pre-defined 
classification variables. The clustering technique has been used in a remarkable 
number of disciplines including archaeology, biology, medicine, psychology and 
marketing. In economics, Crone (2005) uses the technique to explore economic 
regions with similar business cycles in the United States. This study is more closely 
related to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), who applied the cluster analysis to 
classify observations in different exchange rate regimes. 
 
Hierarchical and K-means clustering are two alternative approaches to 
perform the cluster analysis. Hierarchical cluster analysis starts from identifying the 
two closest subjects and grouping them into one cluster. This procedure continues to 
identify the closest subject to the previous formed cluster successively until all 
subjects are grouped into a single cluster. Hierarchical cluster analysis is especially 
useful when the number of clusters is uncertain. This approach, however, assigns 
subjects to a cluster on a single pass of analysis, which prevents the reevaluation of 
previous groupings and reassignment of subjects. 
 
This study follows Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), using the K-means 
cluster analysis, which is an alternative approach that involves repeated attempts to 
reach an optimal assignment for the classification. The K-means clustering partitions 
data into pre-specified k groups through iteration and typically involves two steps. In 
the first step, k observations are selected as the initial centers of clusters and each 
remaining observation is assigned to a closest cluster center. Cluster centers are then 
updated with all assigned observations in the cluster and each observation is re-
assigned to the new closest cluster center in the second step. This step continues 
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iteratively until there is no more reassignment in the current attempt. The number of 
clusters and classification variables required in the K-means cluster analysis are 
further discussed later. 
 
2.1. The Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
Exchange rate, inflation and monetary aggregate are the three nominal 
variables suggested to be the most appealing anchors for monetary policy and are 
frequently mentioned in the literature on monetary policy history. Among these three 
regimes, exchange rate targeting (or fixed exchange rate) and inflation targeting are 
widely studied. Monetary targeting, on the other hand, has received much less 
attention. One potential explanation of this lack of interest relates to the validity of 
this regime.  
 
Monetary targeting is said to be a strategy mostly used in the 1970s. However, 
many studies including Mishkin (2001) have argued that this strategy was not 
seriously pursued. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) also 
suggest that many monetary targeting countries, including the two classical examples 
of Germany and Switzerland, are better viewed as “hybrid” inflation and monetary 
targeters. They also comment that “distinction between inflation and money targeting 
is overstated”. Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998) support these 
arguments with empirical evidence from the policy reaction function. Their 
estimations of policy reaction functions show that Bundesbank, the central bank of 
Germany, responded more to inflation than to the announced target: the growth of 
monetary aggregate.  
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In fact, monetary targeters identified in previous classifications are usually 
rare8. In view of the sensitivity of K-means cluster analysis to groups with extreme 
small number of observations9, the classification regimes in this study focus on the 
two major monetary policy strategies: exchange rate targeting and inflation 
targeting10.  
 
2.2. Classification Variables and Clusters 
 
The definition of “targeting” in monetary policy is not without argument. In 
some literature, a target variable is understood as a variable that the monetary policy 
rule responds to. This literature therefore identifies a de facto regime by estimating 
the significant variables in the central bank’s monetary policy reaction function. On 
the other hand, some literature defines a target (as well as an intermediate target) 
variable as the variable in some forms of loss function. To minimize the loss function, 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (1999) show that monetary policy may 
respond to a set of variables other than the target. The first definition of targeting 
regime using a target variable in monetary policy reaction function, therefore, could 
be misleading. Neither of these two terminologies could be said to be fully 
satisfactory11.  
 
In this classification, a regime targeting a specific economic variable is 
                                                 
8 For example, Stone and Bhundia (2004) have only classified 35 country-year observations as money 
anchors in their 1,353 data. 
9 For example, see Scott and Symons (1971). 
10 Empirically, a cluster for monetary targeters is not identified in various settings of variables and 
number of clusters. 
11 Discussions on the two alternative definitions could be found in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), 
Svensson (1999) and the Appendix A in the working paper version of McCallum and Nelson (1999). 
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defined as in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (1999). The behavior of 
various economic variables in alternative monetary policy regimes could be evaluated 
under a basic New Keynesian model following Galí (2008)12, in which the central 
bank is assumed to follow a simple interest rate rule of the form  
 
tt vrrr   (1)
 
to minimize the following loss function  
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where rt is the nominal interest rate, rr is the constant natural rate of interest, 
  is the coefficient to the zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock, vt, βis the discount factor 
and at is the target variable of the monetary policy. Under the assumption of nominal 
price rigidities and complete international financial markets13, the baseline model can 
be represented by the following (log-linear) equations for output gap, xt and domestic 
inflationπH,t: 
 
 rrErxEx tHttttt   1,11   (3)
tttHttH vxE    1,,  (4)
 
                                                 
12 Clarida et al. (1999) provide a very comprehensive review of the dynamic New Keynesian model. 
Clarida et al. (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005), on the other hand, present variant approaches for 
open economies.  
13 For a small open economy model with uncertainty in the international financial markets, see Leitemo 
and Söderström (2008). 
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where σ and κ represents the response coefficient of the output gap to the 
real interest rate and the response coefficient of the domestic inflation to the output 
gap  respectively. The optimal coefficient in the interest rate rule and the volatility of 
various economic variables under a specific target could be obtained by using the 
method of undetermined coefficients and dynamic optimization. In particular, the 
volatilities of three variables (interest rate as the instrument variable and exchange 
rate and inflation as the target variables) in alternative policy regimes are studied and 
the results are described in Table 1.  
 
The first two rows show that an economic variable usually has lower volatility 
when it is targeted. It is also possible for certain economic structures to lead to 
comparably low volatility in the non-targeted variable as shown in the third row14. In 
all these cases, monetary policy intervention required in the presence of shock leads to 
comparatively high volatility in the interest rate. Finally, the last row suggests that 
low volatility of variables may also be a result of a low magnitude of shock, 
characterized by limited intervention in the interest rate. These four outcomes form 
the fundamental clusters in the classification procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Galí and Monacelli (2005) for the role of openness on the monetary policy rule and its outcome 
in a New Keynesian Model. 
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Table 1. Relative volatility of economic variables under various situations 
   Interest rate 
Volatility 
Exchange 
rate Volatility 
Inflation 
Volatility 
Magnitude 
of Shock 
Openness Targeting    
High Low Inflation High High Low 
High Low Exchange Rate High Low High 
High High Either High Low Low 
Low Either Either Low Low Low 
 
Based on the results in Table 1, volatility of three economic variables, namely 
interest rate, exchange rate and inflation are used as the classification variables. The 
annual volatility of exchange rate and interest rate is measured as the standard 
deviation of the absolute monthly percentage changes in the corresponding variables 
in a calendar year15. Following Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), this study has 
included several major currencies as the reference currencies to compute the exchange 
rate volatility, and the one exhibiting the lowest volatility is used16. Since inflation 
targets are rarely set to be achieved in a short period, such as a year17, the standard 
deviation of monthly inflation rate over a two-year period is used as a measure of 
long-term inflation volatility. Definitions and sources of all data used in this study are 
                                                 
15 Using this measure means crawling peg, a policy that allows the exchange rate to change gradually 
and as planned, is considered as a kind of exchange rate targeting policy.  
16 The reference currencies included in the computation are the US dollar, the British pound, the 
Deutsche Mark, the French franc, the Japanese Yen, the SDR, the ECU and the Euro. Other currencies 
are used for specific countries with reference to Appendix B of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
and the list of currency union in Rose (2000). 
17 For example, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) suggest, “(inflation targets) are typically established for 
multiple horizons ranging from one to four years.” 
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provided in Appendix A18. 
 
2.2.1. Classification Procedure 
 
This study closely follows the classification procedure in Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005). Technically, this study differs from Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) in two areas to improve performance of the cluster analysis.  
It is well known in the cluster analysis literature that K-means algorithms do 
not necessarily converge to a global optimum. The K-means algorithms may 
terminate at different local optimums with different specified initial centers. This 
study uses different sets of random observations instead of one specified set of 
observations in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) as the initial center to address 
the local optimum problem19. The set of initial centers that results in the highest 
similarity measure is adopted. Another problem to be addressed in the K-means 
cluster analysis relates to the standardization of variables. No matter which distance 
measure is used, variables are required to be standardized into the same unit of 
measure. Otherwise, variables with larger values will have a larger impact on the 
classification. The z-normalization is a traditionally-used method for standardization 
and is used in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), but several studies show that 
standardization by range results in consistently superior recovery of the underlying 
                                                 
18 The monthly consumer price index and money market rate are the primary sources of reference to 
compute the monthly inflation rate and interest rate. Supplementary sources of references are used 
when the primary source is not available. For example, quarterly consumer price index and retail price 
index are used for the computation of inflation with appropriate adjustments, while lending rate and 
monetary policy related interest rate are used as the supplementary measure for interest rate. It is 
important to stress that the classification result in this study is not sensitive to the use of supplementary 
sources of references and various definition of classification variables, including the use of short-term 
or long-term inflation. 
19 In particular, the algorithm of this study uses 1,000 randomly selected sets of observations as initial 
centers and the maximum number of iteration is set to 10,000. 
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cluster structure20. In view of this, classification variables are standardized in this 
study by their ranges. 
 
The classification procedure in this study is divided into several steps. K-
means cluster analysis is sensitive to outliers, as they are usually selected as cluster 
centers, and thus results in outlying clusters with a small number of observations. 
Following Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), two percent of the upper tail of 
observations of each classification variables is removed from the data. These outliers 
are classified into alternative monetary policy regimes in the later step. The remaining 
observations are range standardized and classified into the four clusters described in 
Table 1. As described in Table 1, the classification results in two inconclusive 
categories: the first shows evidence of monetary policy intervention, but policy target 
is unclear; the second has low volatility in both instrument and target variables 
because of less intensity of underlying shock.  
 
Observations in these two inconclusive clusters are further analyzed with re-
standardized variables. For observations in the first inconclusive cluster, they are 
further classified into alternative monetary policy regimes in a second stage. In the 
second stage, only the two target variables are used for classification as the data to be 
classified have already shown clear evidence of policy intervention in the previous 
stage. For the second inconclusive cluster, another round of classification with the 
four described clusters using all three classification variables is performed to account 
for different levels of underlying macroeconomic volatility, as suggested in Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). Finally, three rounds of the two-stage classification 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Milligan and Cooper (1988) for a simulation study based on hierarchical cluster 
analysis and Steinley (2004) for a more related study using K-means cluster analysis. 
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have been performed with 1,275 observations left in the inconclusive group. 
 
Descriptive statistics of regimes classified in various rounds and stages are 
provided in Table 2. The result suggests that the magnitude of policy intervention in 
two monetary policy regimes is similar, as reflected in their interest rate volatility. A 
monetary policy regime generally has lower volatility in the target variable and higher 
volatility in the non-target variable. It is important to stress that the classification is 
based on the relative volatility of the classification variables. Therefore, an 
observation in exchange rate targeting regime can have lower volatility of inflation 
than another observation in inflation targeting regimes. This is reflected in the overlap 
of minimum and maximum values of the two target variables between alternative 
regimes. As expected, observations classified in the later round of classification have 
lower volatility in all instrument and economic variables since they are subject to less 
intensity of shock. The statistics in Table 2 also show that statistics of the same 
monetary policy regime in the first and second stage of each round’s classification are 
highly comparable. This suggests that observations classified in the second stage 
belong to the two specified monetary policy regimes: exchange rate targeting and 
inflation targeting instead of another undefined regime. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of various clusters 
 Interest rate volatility Exchange rate volatility Inflation volatility 
in (%) Min Cen. Max Min Cen. Max Min  Cen. Max 
First round          
Inflation targeting 0.00  1.21 7.04 2.42 4.78 10.92 0.54  9.25  38.42 
Ex. rate targeting 0.00  0.81 7.38 0.00 0.77 3.83 10.52  19.64  53.46 
Second stage          
Inf. targeting 3.08  5.50 8.93 2.01 3.13 6.17 2.30  9.21  19.45 
Ex. rate targeting 3.21  6.41 10.88 0.04 0.80 2.24 13.69  21.71  43.40 
Second round          
Inflation targeting 0.00  0.35 1.68 0.74 1.41 3.02 0.15  2.16  8.07 
Ex. rate targeting 0.00  0.21 1.58 0.00 0.24 2.15 3.79  6.16  11.24 
Second stage          
Inf. targeting 0.97  1.66 2.50 0.73 1.25 2.55 0.35  2.65  5.73 
Ex. rate targeting 0.94  1.67 2.54 0.04 0.69 2.03 4.07  6.02  9.72 
Third round          
Inflation targeting 0.00  0.16 0.58 0.30 0.57 0.88 0.15  1.23  3.66 
Ex. rate targeting 0.00  0.11 0.67 0.00 0.06 0.55 1.90  2.83  3.85 
Second stage          
Inf. targeting 0.29  0.58 0.92 0.20 0.39 0.66 0.21  0.90  1.63 
Ex. rate targeting 0.34  0.61 0.97 0.00 0.08 0.25 0.31  1.32  2.84 
 
In the final step, observations that remain unclassified are further analyzed. In 
addition to the 1,275 inconclusive observations in the cluster analysis, this also 
includes the 161 outliers and 3,902 observations with unavailable classification 
variables that are excluded from the classification procedure. The classification of the 
161 outliers is straightforward and most of them can be assigned to one of the cluster 
centers identified in the cluster analysis with minimum distance. The ad hoc 
classification of the 1,275 inconclusive observations and 3,902 observations with 
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unavailable variables is based on the methodology of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2005). An observation is assigned to the exchange rate targeting regime if it (i) has 
zero volatility in the exchange rate, or (ii) is identified as a fixed exchange rate regime 
by the IMF and has less than 0.1% volatility in the exchange rate. Similar to Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), the 0.1% volatility in the exchange rate places a 
comfortable buffer from the minimum exchange rate volatility of the inflation 
targeting regime (which is 0.2%). In this sense, countries without an independent 
legal tender including members of Euro zone are also classified as exchange rate 
targeting. The classification procedure is depicted in Appendix B. 
 
3. The Classification Result 
 
3.1. Comparisons with Other Classifications 
 
The classification has identified 2,957 country-year observations in the 
exchange rate targeting regime and 1,489 observations in the inflation targeting 
regime. Table 3 presents comparisons between the current analysis and several 
existing classifications to offer some understanding about the result. The upper panel 
compares the result to two de facto classifications. Not surprisingly, most of the 
inflation targeting regimes identified in this study come from the float and 
intermediate regimes in LYS (2005)21. A few exceptions are New Zealand (1986, 
1989, 1992, 1993–2004), Finland (1980, 1982–89, 1991–1996), Norway (1983–84, 
1995–2003) and Bostwana (1984–86, 1988–94, 1997–2004), which are fixed 
exchange rate regimes in LYS (2005), but inflation targeters in the current study. New 
                                                 
21 The latest version of LYS classification has been extended to cover the period up to 2004 and is 
available at the website of Levy-Yeyati. 
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Zealand and Finland are widely agreed inflation targeting countries since the 1990s in 
the literature. Norway, on the other hand, is not traditionally recognized as an inflation 
targeter. Stone and Bhundia (2004), however, find that the country has been using de 
facto inflation targeting policy (named as implicit price anchor) since late 1990s, and 
continues to do so after the central bank announced an inflation target in 2001.  
 
Table 3. Comparison between classifications 
 (a) Comparisons with de facto classifications 
Regime All data 
(1974–2009) 
LYS (1974–2004) SB (1990–2005) 
 Fix Non-fix Fix IT 
Inflation targeting 1,489 238 717 155 218 
Exchange rate targeting 2,952 1,959 237 367 0 
      
 (b) Comparisons with de jure classifications 
  IMF (2001–2009 ) Fatas et al. (1974–2000) 
  Fix IT Others De Jure IT 
Inflation targeting 1,489 134 202 397 69 
Exchange rate targeting 2,952 719 6 260 0 
      
Periods covered in other classifications are various. The total number of observations in other studies 
does not necessarily equal the total number of observations in this study. 
 
The case of New Zealand, Finland and Norway highlights the importance of 
having a clearly defined alternative policy regime in the classification. Consider their 
heavy intervention in foreign exchange markets and relative stable currencies: these 
countries could be easily grouped with other fixed exchange rate regimes. The 
inclusion of inflation targeting as the alternative monetary policy regime in this study 
reveals that their intervention in exchange rates could be a way to stabilize the 
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inflation or, at least, inflation has a higher priority than exchange rate as their 
monetary policy targets. 
 
Botswana is probably a more interesting case for discussion. The country’s 
currency, Pula, was first pegged to the US dollar in 1976 and then to a currency basket 
in 1980. Therefore, the country is identified to have a fixed exchange rate in most 
classifications. The peg of Pula, however, is far from stable and has experienced 
frequent and substantial adjustments. In many cases, the revaluation or devaluation 
was introduced as an anti-inflation measure22. Several studies also support this view 
by identifying inflation as a key variable in the monetary reaction function of the 
Bank of Botswana23. 
 
Of those regimes successfully identified in this study, all of the de facto 
inflation targeters in Stone and Bhundia (2004) are grouped into the inflation targeting 
regime in this study as well. A non-negligible proportion of exchange rate anchors in 
Stone and Bhundia (2004), on the other hand, is identified as inflation targeters in this 
study24. A possible explanation of this divergence is that Stone and Bhundia (2004) 
have excluded the exchange rate anchors from their de facto classification procedure. 
Instead, they adopted the identification for exchange rate anchors from the IMF 
classification, which is considered a mixed de jure-de facto approach based on 
subjective judgment. 
                                                 
22 For example, Pula has been adjusted seven times in the 12-year period from 1980 to 1991. Each 
adjustment ranged from 5% to 15%. Masalila and Motshidisi (2003), a study of the Bank for 
International Settlements by two researchers from the Bank of Botswana provides the background of 
the exchange rate policy of Botswana in more detail. 
23 See, for example, Bleaney and Lisenda (2001) and Setlhare (2004). 
24 The de facto inflation targeters in Stone and Bhundia (2004) include the full-fledged integration 
targeting regime and implicit price stability anchor, while exchange rate anchor comes from 
nonautonomous (monetary policy) regime and exchange rate peg. Of the 232 inflation targeters 
classified in Stone and Bhundia (2004), 20 of them are classified as inconclusive in this study. 
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A comparison with the de jure or partial de jure classification by the IMF and 
Fatas et al. (2007) in the lower panel reveals another interesting story. There are no 
“pretended inflation targeters” since all countries announcing inflation targets are also 
de facto inflation targeters. However, there are quite a large number of “hidden 
inflation targeters”, which describe themselves as fixed exchange rate regimes but 
target inflation in practice. Unsurprisingly, many of these “hidden inflation targeters” 
are also classified as “implicit price stability anchors” according to their inflation 
performance in Stone and Bhundia (2004). Central bank communications, especially 
those on the policy target, are widely agreed to be one of the pillars of the inflation 
targeting framework. The existence of a large number of “hidden inflation targeters” 
is therefore an important area for further exploration. Even though an explanation for 
“hidden inflation targeters” is out of the scope of this study, the study of Morris and 
Shin (2002) may offer a hint. The main conclusion in Morris and Shin (2002) and 
subsequent follow-ups in Svensson (2006) and Morris et al. (2006) is that central bank 
communications could reduce social welfare in some special circumstances, including 
the case of imprecise information. This explanation is consistent with the fact that a 
larger share of the “hidden inflation targeters” comes from the pre-1990s period when 
central bank information is likely less precise than the later period. 
 
3.2. An Interpretation of the Monetary History 
 
The number and percentage of classified regimes in various periods from 1974 
to 2009 are presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Classification of monetary policy regime by year 
 All Countries Advanced Emerging 
 All IT Hidden IT ET IT ET IT ET 
1974-79 71 
(13%) 
61 
(86%) 
489 
(87%) 
55 
(56%) 
43 
(44%) 
8 
(14%) 
50 
(86%) 
1980-89 334 
(30%) 
182 
(54%) 
791 
(70%) 
145 
(70%) 
62 
(30%) 
56 
(55%) 
45 
(45%) 
1990-99 472 
(39%) 
147 
(31%) 
743 
(61%) 
175 
(76%) 
56 
(24%) 
78 
(56%) 
62 
(44%) 
2000-09 612 
(40%) 
N.A. 
(-) 
929 
(60%) 
156 
(50%) 
158 
(50%) 
145 
(76%) 
45 
(24%) 
        
Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage of classified observations in the corresponding category 
for total, advanced countries and emerging countries. Figures in the parentheses are the percentage of 
total inflation targeting regimes for hidden inflation targeters. 
 
Generally speaking, the figures are consistent with the impression that 
inflation targeting has been emerging as a more typical strategy in the past few 
decades. Exchange rate targeting, on the other hand, is still common, but its share has 
been diminishing since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Most existing 
literature starts its discussion on inflation targeting history since the 1980s, when 
countries began to have a formal inflation targeting framework in place. The statistics 
suggest that de facto inflation targeting actually has a longer history with most of 
them acting as hidden inflation targeters. 
 
Inflation targeting has displaced exchange rate targeting as the major monetary 
policy regime in the advanced economies, immediately after the fall of the Bretton 
Woods system, and became more popular in the 1980s and 1990s. The trend only 
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reversed in the last decade when some European countries decided to give up their 
monetary policy autonomy to adopt the new single currency, the Euro. Emerging 
countries, on the other hand, seem to be more hesitant in shifting their targets from 
exchange rate to inflation in the early period but have finally caught up to the trend in 
the later period. 
 
The classification supports the argument of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and 
Bernanke et al. (1999) that the two self-described monetary targeters, Germany and 
Switzerland, share many similarities with other countries using inflation targeting. For 
most yearly data, these two countries are classified as de facto inflation targeters. The 
Euro area is not considered a single entity in the classification procedure, but the 
monetary strategy of the European Central Bank should be an interesting case for 
discussion. Using out-of-sample classification, the European Central Bank has been 
adopting inflation targeting since its inception25. 
 
 
4. The Two Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
4.1. Stylized Facts 
 
Stylized facts of the two monetary policy regimes are described in Table 5 
based on the simple averages of two groups. The result could be interpreted together 
with similar studies in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Husain et al. (2005) and 
the survey by Tavlas et al. (2008) for the exchange rate regimes; Rose (2007), Ball 
                                                 
25 Complete yearly data for the Euro area is available from 2000 to 2009. The Euro area has the nearest 
distance to the inflation targeting clusters in the second or the third round classification. 
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and Sheridan (2005) and the survey by Walsh (2009) for the inflation targeting 
regimes. Unlike these studies, the two alternative monetary policy regimes are well- 
identified for comparison in this study. 
 
Table 5. Economic Performance and Characteristics of the Two Regimes 
 All Countries Advanced Emerging 
 IT ET      IT ET      IT ET 
 (a) Economic Performance of Two Regimes 
Duration in years 3.47 9.58 (***) 5.87 5.32 (   ) 3.04 2.34 (   ) 
Crisis tally 0.92 0.97 (   ) 0.58 0.67 (   ) 1.19 1.63 (***) 
Real GDP growth 3.38 3.92 (***) 3.07 2.97 (   ) 3.63 3.99 (   ) 
Inflation 12.87 44.92 (***) 5.51 9.11 (   ) 13.99 163.00 (***) 
excluding >250 11.96 11.61 (   ) 5.51 6.74 (   ) 13.99 23.14 (***) 
Effective exchange 
rate volatility:  
      
Nominal 1.78 1.32 (***) 1.16 0.69 (***) 2.17 1.92 (   ) 
Real 1.91 1.76 (   ) 1.15 0.62 (***) 2.20 2.25 (   ) 
  
 (b) Economic Characteristics of Two Regimes 
Real GDP (in bn) 583.25 106.85 (***) 1,412.45 538.96 (***) 296.72 335.33 (   ) 
Real GDP per 
capita (in ‘000) 
14.25 8.57 (***) 32.18 34.28 (   ) 5.93 5.29 (   ) 
Trade openness 0.34 0.45 (***) 0.33 0.66 (***) 0.35 0.32 (   ) 
Trade concentration 0.25 0.28 (***) 0.23 0.23 (   ) 0.25 0.25 (   ) 
Capital openness 0.03 0.06 (***) 0.07 0.44 (***) 0.02 0.02 (   ) 
Years in Office 5.71 8.26 (***) 3.99 4.44 (   ) 4.44 5.91 (** ) 
       
*** and ** represent that the two simple means of inflation targeting regime and exchange rate 
targeting regime are significantly different at the 1% and 5% level, respectively based on the Welch’s t 
statistics. 
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The duration of a regime is measured as the mean of the average number of 
years a country maintains the regime to avoid the overrepresentation of countries with 
frequent regime changes. As shown in the upper panel of Table 5, the exchange rate 
targeting regime is significantly more durable than the inflation targeting regime in 
the full sample. This result is found to be mainly affected by the extreme durable peg 
of several small and developing countries as well as countries in the currency union26. 
The difference in duration ceases to exist in the sample of advanced and emerging 
countries, which is more comparable to the results in Husain et al. (2005) and Rose 
(2007). 
 
The crisis tally of the two regimes is calculated with the financial crisis 
database from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). The two regimes show no significant 
difference in the occurrence of crisis in the sample of all countries and advanced 
countries. Exchange rate targeting in emerging countries, by contrast, reports a 
significantly higher crisis statistics. This result is in line with the finding in Husain et 
al. (2005) and is consistent with the observation of more sudden stops of capital flows 
for non-inflation targeters in Rose (2007)27. 
 
As for the economic performance of two monetary policy regimes, the results 
generally support Husain et al. (2005), that exchange rate targeting regime has a 
higher unconditional average economic growth, inflation rate and lower exchange rate 
volatility. The growth rate in real GDP per capita is higher for exchange rate targeting 
                                                 
26 The duration for countries in currency unions is found to be extremely long, with an average of 24 
years. Excluding currency unions from the exchange rate, targeting regime reduces its average duration 
from 9.58 years to 5.25 years. The difference remains significant at 5% level.  
27 See, for example, Calvo et al. (2006) for the relationship between a sudden stop of capital flow and 
crisis in emerging economies. 
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regime, but the difference is not significant in advanced and emerging countries. The 
result on the inflation rate level is consistent across various subsamples but is found to 
be affected by a few hyperinflation observations in the exchange rate targeting 
regime. Once the hyperinflation data is removed, the inflation levels of the two 
regimes are more comparable and the differences in all countries become 
insignificant. 
 
4.2. Who Targets Inflation? 
 
The choice of monetary policy regimes is itself endogenous and depends on 
economic structures. Literature attempts to identify the structural differences between 
inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters, including Gerlach (1999) and Carare 
and Stone (2006). Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010), on the other hand, empirically estimated 
the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes using variables with stronger theoretical 
support. The lower panel of Table 5 presents the key variables used in Levy-Yeyati et 
al. (2010) for the two monetary policy regimes. The size of the economy as 
represented by the real GDP, trade openness and concentration, captures the 
importance of trade aspects suggested by the optimal currency area. Capital openness, 
as measured by the total flows of portfolio investments as a share of GDP, is the main 
proxy in the financial theory, which argues a stable exchange rate is preferable to 
avoid currency mismatch in financial assets and liabilities. The variable of years in 
office is the number of years that the incumbent administration has been in office. 
According to the sustainability hypothesis in the political theory, a weak government 
(as indicated by fewer years in office) is difficult to sustain a fixed exchange rate. This 
argument is even stronger when inflation targeting is identified as the alternative 
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monetary policy regime since inflation, different from the exchange rate, is non-
tradable and therefore not subject to speculation. 
 
Table 6. Probit Regression Results for Inflation Targeting Regime 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real GDP 0.714*** 
(0.079)    
0.484*** 
(0.072)    
0.665*** 
(0.085)    
-1.018*   
(0.566)    
Trade openness -0.908    
(0.577)    
-2.431*** 
(0.578)    
-1.136*   
(0.583)    
-3.128    
(4.768)    
Trade concentration -0.020    
(0.576)    
0.003    
(0.185)    
-0.002    
(0.183)    
-4.640*** 
(1.547)    
Capital openness -4.141*** 
(1.195)    
-4.806*** 
(1.198)    
-4.458*** 
(1.224)    
-5.538    
(12.079)    
Years in office -0.268*** 
(0.078)    
-0.282*** 
(0.075)    
-0.235*** 
(0.080)    
-0.078    
(0.662)    
Advanced Country 
 
0.864**  
(0.339)    
 
1.753    
(3.662)    
Emerging Country 
 
-0.075    
(0.322)    
 
8.534    
(4.569)    
Real GDP per capita 
 
  
-0.124    
(0.103)    
 
Inflation 
   
-0.483*** 
(0.131)    
     
N 2,422 2,422 2,422 369 
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.092 0.089 0.548 
     
The dependent variable is the dummy for de facto inflation targeting regime in model (1) to (3) and it is 
the dummy for de jure inflation targeting regime in Model (4). All regressions include an intercept. 
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Model (1) to (3) include year dummies and Model (4) includes dummies for decades. All variables 
except years in office and the dummies for advanced and emerging countries are the lagged values. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
The choice of inflation targeting regime is estimated by a Probit regression 
using panel data with random effects, and the results are presented in Table 6. The 
results generally mirror the findings in Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010). Consistent with the 
simple averages measured in the lower panel of Table 5, models (1) to (3), under 
various specifications, suggest that inflation targeters are less open in terms of trade 
and capital flow, larger in economic size and have weaker governments as reflected in 
the fewer years in office. The effect of trade concentration, however, is not significant. 
 
The estimation result of model (2) shows that advanced countries are more 
likely to use inflation targeting as their monetary policy strategy. Interestingly, this 
result is not caused by the higher income level in advanced countries as reflected in 
the insignificant effect of the real GDP per capita in model (3). This suggests that 
institutional factors, for example, independence and credibility of central banks rather 
than economic characteristics, may better explain the wide adoption of inflation 
targeting in advanced countries.  
 
Model (4) aims to explore the determinants for an inflation targeter to formally 
adopt a de jure inflation targeting regime (in many cases, with the announcement of 
an inflation target). The sample is therefore largely reduced to observations that are 
identified as de facto inflation targeters and included in the data set from Fatas et al. 
(2007). The result shows that inflation targeters of smaller size and with lower trade 
concentration are more likely to explicitly establish an inflation target. The 
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significance of the lagged inflation rate level in the estimation also supports several 
comments made in the literature that a central bank usually announces a formal 
inflation target after it has successfully controlled inflation to a lower level and 
establishes its credibility in fighting inflation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Existing literature on the evaluation of alternative monetary policy regimes is 
separate in the areas of exchange rate arrangements and inflation targeting strategy. 
The absence of a well-defined regime for a floating exchange rates and non-inflation 
targeters makes the assessment of a specific monetary policy strategy less convincing. 
One of the explanations for this separation in monetary policy literature rests on the 
absence of a comprehensive and, more importantly, de facto classification for 
monetary policy regimes. 
 
This paper offers a de facto classification for two major and widely used 
monetary policy strategies: exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting. Countries 
in the 35-year post-Bretton Woods period are grouped into the two regimes according 
to their actual behavior in the instrument and target variables using K-means cluster 
analysis.  
 
The validity of the classification in this study is supported with the consistency 
between the evidences revealed in this paper and the findings in existing literature. 
Evolution of two monetary policy regimes in various countries over years provided 
from the classification results are in accord with the conventional understanding of 
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monetary policy history, in general. The economic performance and characteristics of 
the two regimes as well as the determinants of the choice of monetary policy regimes 
also agree with other studies in the literature. The inclusion of a well-defined, 
inflation targeting regime as the alternative in the classification, on the other hand, 
avoid the misclassification of widely-agreed inflation targeters as exchange rate 
targeting countries. The de facto classification approach based on the observed 
behavior of economic variables instead of announced inflation targets also helps 
reveal the existence of “hidden inflation targeters”. 
 
Stylized facts of the two monetary policy regimes documented should shed 
light on the possible effects of monetary policy strategy on economy. However, it is 
important to note that comparisons on various economic performances of the two 
regimes are unconditional and therefore require caution in interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the de facto classification of monetary policy regimes in this study 
should pave the way for future exploration of the economic impacts of alternative 
monetary policy regimes. 
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Appendix A: Data Definitions and Sources 
Variables Definitions and sources  
Crisis tally Crisis tally in the database from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).  
Capital openness The sum of absolute value of inward and outward flows of portfolio 
investments as a ratio of GDP (source: IFS) 
 
Exchange rate volatility The standard deviation of absolute monthly percentage changes of 
nominal exchange rate in a calendar year (source: IFS). 
 
Interest rate volatility The standard deviation of absolute monthly changes of money 
market rate in a calendar year, supplemented with lending rate and 
monetary policy related interest rate (source: IFS). 
 
Inflation Annual percentage change in consumer price index, supplemented 
with retail price index (source: IFS). 
 
Inflation volatility The standard deviation of absolute monthly changes in consumer 
price index over the current and next year, supplemented with 
monthly changes in retail price index and quarterly changes in 
consumer price index with adjustment (source: IFS). 
 
Nominal effective 
exchange rate volatility 
The average of absolute monthly percentage changes of nominal 
effective exchange rates in a calendar year (source: IFS). 
 
Real effective exchange 
rate volatility 
The average of absolute monthly percentage changes of real 
effective exchange rates in a calendar year (source: IFS). 
 
Real GDP Gross domestic product in USD at current prices adjusted with the 
real GDP growth rate (source: World Bank). 
 
Real GDP growth Annual percentage change in gross domestic product at constant 
prices (source: World Bank). 
 
Real GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita in USD at current prices adjusted 
with real GDP growth rate (source: World Bank). 
 
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports over GDP (source: IFS).  
Trade concentration The maximum share of total trade to a specific country (source: 
Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF) 
 
Years in office Years the incumbent administration has been in office (source: 
database of Political Institutions 2012) 
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Appendix B: The Classification Procedure 
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